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This essay is a discussion of the role of 
the forensic psychiatrist in malpractice 
cases as an expert witness establishing the 
standards of care for the psychiatric pro- 
fession. The occasion for these com- 
ments, which hopefully will lead to con- 
structive dialogue and response, is the 
much discussed malpractice case of Weiz- 
dell Williamson v. Doctor Myron Liptzin 
(Cal., Orange County Sup. Ct., Dkt. No. 
97CVS690). The case achieved public 
notoriety when it was a featured segment 
of the CBS television program "60 Min- 
utes,'' and it has also produced contro- 
versy about standards of care within psy- 
chiatry. ' 
The professional controversy* might 
be stated as follows: how can most of his 
professional peers who work in university 
mental health services believe that Dr. 
Liptzin did a superb job in his care of 
Williamson and that quite unforeseeably 
-- 
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* T h e  case was the basis for a plenary session at the 
November 1998 meeting of the Group for the Advance- 
ment of Psychiatry (GAP). Most of the GAP members 
who spoke supported Dr. Liptzin. 
a tragedy occurred, whereas the, psychiat- 
ric experts who testified against him in 
court "honestly" believed that Dr. Liptzin 
was negligent on several grounds and 
should be held liable for the tragic result? 
This controversy demonstrates that 
there are major disagreements about the 
applicable standards of care in psychiatry 
and that psychiatrists who testify in court, 
particularly forensic psychiatrists, may 
reach substantially different judgments 
and have different values than their col- 
leagues. I am not making the simplistic 
argument that all forensic psychiatrists 
think alike on substantive matters. If that 
were the case, then either Dr. Liptzin or 
his patient would have been unable to 
secure a forensic expert. My thesis is 
more subtle and perhaps more difficult to 
defend. Nonetheless, this essay will argue 
that the controversy in the Liptzin case is 
in part the result both of changes in the 
law and climate of malpractice litigation 
and of the altered professional values of 
forensic psychiatrists and others who tes- 
tify as expert witnesses. 
Malpractice litigation was almost non- 
existent in psychiatry until the last 30 
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years. It is now a small cottage industry 
offering remunerative opportunities to the 
expert witnesses who consult with law- 
yers. review medical records, offer opin- 
ions, and testify at depositions and in 
court.2 There is now a market for experts 
in which the purchasers are lawyers and 
the mental health professionals are the 
suppliers competing for a niche. As is 
true everywhere else in the mental health 
arena, psychiatrists find themselves in- 
creasingly forced to compete with foren- 
sic psychologists, forensic social workers, 
and nurses. The potential economic re- 
wards are substantial, and many psychia- 
trists find forensic work more stimulating 
than clinical practice or at least a wel- 
come variation in their professional rou- 
tine. There is nothing unique about the 
growth of forensic mental health profes- 
sionals; every discipline that has relevant 
expertise to offer is selling its services in 
the legal market, a market that is much 
wider than malpractice. Considerations of 
reputation and economics loom large for 
the increasingly numerous and competi- 
tive suppliers of marketable expertise. 
The standard of care in psychiatric 
treatment, which is the central question in 
malpractice cases, is by no means the 
"natural" province of the subspecialty of 
forensic psychiatrists. They are certainly 
more expert than their colleagues about 
law, testimony in court, and the legal 
process, but there is nothing in the pro- 
fessional training or experience of a fo- 
rensic psychiatrist that would make him 
particularly qualified to establish profes- 
sional standards of care for the general 
psychiatrist or for other subspecialties in 
psychiatry. Indeed, one might assume that 
as in any other medical subspecialty, the 
successful practitioner of forensic psychi- 
atry would lose touch with the current 
standards of care in clinical settings in 
which he no longer works or has had no 
substantial experience. One would not re- 
fer an acutely psychotic university stu- 
dent for evaluation or consultation about 
treatment to a colleague because he is a 
forensic psychiatrist. Yet, if something 
goes wrong in treatment, a forensic psy- 
chiatrist may well appear, as in the Lipt- 
zin case. and testify about how such a 
student should have been treated (i.e., the 
applicable standards of care and the 
breach of those standards by the psychi- 
atrist who does specialize in the care of 
acutely psychotic young adults). Al- 
though forensic psychiatrists by no means 
have a monopoly on the role of expert 
witness in malpractice litigation, they 
have been major players%nd have had a 
significant and I believe problematic im- 
pact. It is not my argument that forensic 
psychiatrists are the only problem in this 
area. Elsewhere I have described how 
partisan practitioners have used the legal 
process to impose their own standards of 
care on their colleagues or to advance 
their own special interests4 Nonetheless, 
I believe that forensic psychiatry merits 
particular scrutiny. 
I have not identified any of the expert 
witnesses in the Liptzin case by name. 
and my analysis and criticisms are di- 
rected at what I take to be general prac- 
tices and not at the plaintiff's experts or at 
some unusual departure in their testi- 
mony. My understanding is that each side 
used a forensic psychiatrist and a psychi- 
atrist with experience in a university men- 
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tal health center.+ As in an earlier paper 
discussing the ethics of forensic psychia- 
try, it should be noted that mine is "a view 
from the Ivory ~ o w e r . " ~  I do not claim to 
have done an empirical survey; these are 
no more than my thoughts, reflections, 
and opinions. 
Dr. Myron Liptzin is a respected psy- 
chiatrist who specialized in the treatment 
of university students. Five years ago he 
retired as chief of psychiatry at the stu- 
dent health center, University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill, where he had 
earned a reputation as a skillful clinician 
who was particularly adept at crisis inter- 
vention. If Dr. Liptzin had hoped to go on 
to a less hectic and stressful life. his ex- 
pectations were shattered when he found 
himself accused of negligence in one of 
the more unusual cases of psychiatric 
malpractice in this decade. A former pa- 
tient went on a rampage, killing two peo- 
ple and then blaming Dr. Liptzin, suing 
him for negligence. The verdict against 
the psychiatrist was front page news and 
the CBS program "60 Minutes" came to 
North Carolina to do a story that aired in 
mid-November of 1998. 
It was the spring of 1994 when Dr. 
Liptzin first encountered Wendell Wil- 
liamson. The 26-year-old man was a sec- 
ond-year student at the University of 
North Carolina Law School and was in 
the throes of a psychotic episode. He had 
disrupted a law school class proclaiming 
that he had telepathic powers. This occur- 
rence brought him to the attention of the 
Dr. Liptzin presented his thoughts about the case to a 
meeting of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry 
in November 1998, where the present writer gave a 
preliminary version of this essay. 
dean of students, who set up an emer- 
gency appointment and escorted William- 
son to Dr. Liptzin's office. 
It was not the first psychotic break for 
the young man; two years earlier he had a 
similar episode, which had led to an 
emergency civil commitment. He fought 
that hospitalization tooth and nail. His 
psychiatrists were unable to establish a 
therapeutic alliance, and their attempts to 
impose involuntary treatment on him 
failed when at his hearing a judge ruled 
on the information then available that he 
could not be involuntarily treated. He was 
therefore released. Williamson suppos- 
edly had made verbal promises to the 
judge that he would accept outpatient 
care, but he had failed to do so. During 
this hospitalization the psychiatrists fol- 
lowed all of the relevant procedures that 
Dr. Liptzin allegedly breached. 
Despite this daunting past history and 
the patient's almost total lack of insight 
into his mental disorder, Dr. Liptzin not 
only avoided a confrontation when the 
young man was brought to his office, he 
was also able to establish a therapeutic 
alliance and achieve compliance in a reg- 
imen of appropriate antipsychotic medi- 
cation in the very first session. In six 
visits over the next several weeks, Wen- 
dell Williamson made a rapid social re- 
covery. Dr. Liptzin was able to maintain a 
therapeutic alliance by using his psy- 
chodynamic and interpersonal skills to 
avoid a confrontation with his patient's 
delusional grandiosity. The patient went 
from his acute psychotic and disruptive 
condition to being stable enough to get 
through the stressful spring semester at 
law school. 
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Judged by that result, most psychia- 
trists would conclude that Dr. Liptzin was 
a superb clinician. Dr. Paul Appelbaum, 
who reportedly looked into this case for 
the American Psychiatric ~ssociation,' 
stated on "60 Minutes" that Dr. Liptzin 
"did an exceptional job." Most of Dr. 
Liptzin's colleagues in university mental 
health who make up the Group for the 
Advancement of Psychiatry (GAP) Com- 
mittee on the College Student concur with 
this judgment. Thus, there is a "respect- 
able majority" of the profession who 
would agree that far from negligent psy- 
chiatric care, the substance of Dr. Lipt- 
zin's actual treatment of his patient was 
superb-beyond what most of us could do. 
However, things did start to go wrong 
after Williamson completed that semester 
and his treatment with Dr. Liptzin had 
ended. Dr. Liptzin had informed William- 
son along with his other patients that he 
would be retiring. The accepted practice 
at the university clinic was to assign pa- 
tients in rotation to the available staff; Dr. 
Liptzin therefore advised Williamson that 
when he (Williamson) returned in the fall 
for his third year of law school, he would 
need to come to the clinic to be assigned 
a new therapist. Since Williamson's plans 
over the summer were uncertain, Dr. 
Liptzin gave him a prescription for one 
month's supply of medication and re- 
ferred him either to his family doctor or to 
someone at the community mental health 
center near his home to get the prescrip- 
tion refilled. Dr. Liptzin said that these 
discharge arrangements followed the 
standards of care in the university mental 
health center over which he presided. 
This nonspecific referral and other "pro- 
cedural matters" became the major issues 
in the subsequent malpractice case. The 
patient, in fact, never had his prescription 
filled or sought further psychiatric care. 
Williamson stopped taking his medica- 
tion shortly after leaving Dr. Liptzin, and 
over the next several months grandiose, 
paranoid, and somatic delusions prolifer- 
ated and became entrenched. He began 
for the first time to think about violent 
retaliation against his persecutors. Eight 
months after he had last seen Dr. Liptzin, 
he acted on a plan he had rehearsed by 
shooting at trees on his grandparents' 
abandoned farm. Armed with a rifle and 
dressed in military camouflage, he went 
out into the streets of Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina, and shot and killed two people 
and seriously wounded a policeman be- 
fore he could be stopped and arrested. He 
acknowledged subsequently that he had 
never told Dr. Liptzin about this violent 
plan because it never occurred to him 
until after he had left treatment. This 
seems to confirm Dr. Liptzin's own state- 
ment that when he evaluated Williamson 
there was no salient risk factor to indicate 
dangerousness and no way he could have 
foreseen his patient's violence. The state 
of North Carolina charged Williamson 
with 15 counts, including murder, but a 
jury found him not guilty by reason of 
insanity-not blameworthy on all counts. 
Williamson was confined to a state fa- 
cility where he apparently began to pon- 
der the question of who was to blame. 
The onetime law student resolved to bring 
a malpractice suit against Dr. Liptzin on 
the premise that his psychiatrist, and not 
he, was responsible for the tragedy of 
these murders that had ruined his life. He 
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contacted a lawyer who was willing to 
press his lawsuit and was able without 
difficulty to retain two psychiatrists who 
were prepared to testify that Dr. Liptzin 
had in fact been negligent. One of these 
experts was a forensic psychiatrist who 
had testified on behalf of Williamson at 
his criminal trial and who reportedly 
thought that there were grounds for a 
malpractice suit. This is not a Tarasoff 
case in which the victims of violence sue 
the perpetrator's psychiatrist. Here, the 
perpetrator himself was claiming to be the 
victim of negligence. 
Williamson's lawyer had a very diffi- 
cult case to make. He not only would 
have to convince a jury that Dr. Liptzin 
was negligent, he would need to persuade 
them that none of the actions Williamson 
took contributed "as a legal cause to the 
harm he [had] ~uffered."~ North Carolina 
is one of only five states that still adheres 
to the traditional doctrine of Contributory 
Negligence. Briefly, the case law theory 
of Contributory Negligence, as summa- 
rized by prosser6 is ". . . that the plain- 
tiff's negligence is an intervening, or in- 
sulating, cause between the defendant's 
negligence and the result" (p. 417). Dr. 
Liptzin's lawyers went into the case as- 
suming that many of the actions taken by 
Williamson would constitute intervening 
causes that would provide a defense for 
the psychiatrist even in the unlikely event 
he was deemed negligent. Furthermore, 
North Carolina has resisted the general 
trend toward a national standard for med- 
ical specialties such as psychiatry. North 
Carolina General Statutes, 590-21.12, 
provides that the standards to be applied 
in malpractice cases are "the standards of 
practice among members of the same 
health care profession with similar train- 
ing and experience situated in the same or 
similar communities." The case law indi- 
cates that this statute allows variations in 
resources to have an impact on standards 
of care. 
Much to the astonishment of most ex- 
perienced observers, the case was not dis- 
missed. Williamson v. Liptzin went to 
trial, and despite the same or similar com- 
munity standards for malpractice and the 
doctrine of Contributory Negligence, a 
North Carolina jury found that Dr. Lipt- 
zin was negligent and that his negligence 
was the proximate cause of the tragedy 
and awarded Mr. Williamson $500,000 in 
damages. No legal precedent was estab- 
lished in the trial, but the verdict seemed 
to stretch the envelope of legal liability 
and common sense. Many psychiatrists 
shared Dr. Appelbaum's assessment of 
the case, given on "60 Minutes," where 
he stated that it was unprecedented to 
reward the "perpetrator of two murders" 
and hold a psychiatrist responsible for 
something "that couldn't possibly have 
been foreseen." Dr. Appelbaum also com- 
mented: "I think the jurors made a mis- 
take in this case." He may be right; jurors, 
according to some observers, seem more 
willing to ignore the law and come to 
their own mistaken conclusions.7 But the 
jurors were provided with expert psychi- 
atric opinion on the standards of care; and 
in this case, given the legal obstacle of 
contributory negligence, the experts who 
testified against Dr. Liptzin must have 
been quite persuasive. Because of the 
controversy and the "60 Minutes" cover- 
age, some of the jurors came forward and 
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made public statements. It seems clear 
that they were deeply influenced by the 
plaintiff's experts' testimony that Dr. 
Liptzin had negligently failed to make the 
right DSM-IV diagnosis and failed to in- 
form his patient about the gravity of his 
illness as was supposedly required by the 
same or similar community standards of 
care. They seemed to accept without 
question the proposition that if Dr. Lipt- 
zin had recorded the diagnosis of schizo- 
phrenia, paranoid type, and told his pa- 
tient that he had this very serious mental 
disorder, the patient would have taken his 
medication. There is nothing in my clin- 
ical experience that would substantiate 
their view; indeed, during his earlier hos- 
pitalization he was told how sick he was, 
and it lead to a total therapeutic impasse. 
Although Dr. Liptzin provided me with 
a brief summary of the case, most of the 
facts I have reported above and shall elab- 
orate below are from various additional 
public and nonconfidential sources. There 
are doubtless many different versions of 
the facts, and I make no claim that my 
description is definitive. Others who have 
access to the trial transcript (not available 
at this writing) may come to quite another 
perhaps better and more detailed under- 
standing. The forensic psychiatrist and 
the other expert witness who testified on 
behalf of Wendell Williamson identified 
several breaches of the same or similar 
community standards of care, among 
which were the following: ( I )  negligent 
diagnosis (Liptzin's recorded diagnosis 
was delusional disorder rather than 
schizophrenic disorder, paranoid type); 
(2) negligent failure to inform the patient 
about the actual diagnosis and the life- 
time, disabling severity of such a schizo- 
phrenic disorder, and thus, he failed to 
make the patient realize the dangers of 
not taking his medication; Dr. Liptzin 
told his patient he was "wired differently 
than other people"; (3) negligent failure 
to read the entire record of the patient's 
earlier involuntary hospitalization-he 
read only the discharge summary; (4) fail- 
ure to recognize risk factors for violence; 
and 5) failure to refer the patient to a 
specific psychiatrist for further treatment. 
These "breaches" of the standard of 
care consist of what can legitimately be 
described as procedural rather than sub- 
stantive failings that, if corrected, would 
not have actually changed the outcome. 
For example, Dr. Liptzin stated that the 
treatment of delusional disorder in his 
clinic was identical to that for schizo- 
phrenic disorder, paranoid type (i.e., cri- 
sis intervention, a therapeutic alliance, 
and efficacious levels of antipsychotic 
medication). Thus, the patient received 
exactly the substantive treatment he re- 
quired, and the crucial consideration was 
to have him accept treatment, not to con- 
vince him that he suffered from a schizo- 
phrenic disorder.' Neither in my own ex- 
perience, as I noted previously, nor in the 
scientific literature is there any empirical 
basis for believing that when patients like 
Mr. Williamson are informed that they 
have a very serious schizophrenic disor- 
der they are more likely to comply with a 
regimen of antipsychotic medication. 
Again that seems to have been the proce- 
' It also should be emphasized that university mental 
health centers have traditionally erred on the side of 
giving students the less serious and less damaging diag- 
nosis. 
456 J Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1999 
The Forensic Psychiatrist as Expert Witness 
dure followed by his physicians when he 
was involuntarily confined and he refused 
to take the prescribed medication. There 
is also no reason to believe that reading 
the entire record of the patient's earlier 
unsuccessful treatment, or identifying pe- 
riodic substance abuse and the patient's 
age as risk factors in a clinical risk as- 
sessment, would have led Dr. Liptzin or 
any other psychiatrists to recognize how 
very dangerous Williamson would be- 
come. The final issue, not referring the 
patient to a specific psychiatrist, caused 
me the greatest concern. That is my own 
standard of care in dealing with a very 
small private practice, and I believe that 
the lack of continuity of care is the great- 
est failing in psychiatry and modern med- 
icine generally. 
However, Dr. Liptzin asserts that under 
the time constraints of the university 
mental health center, it was standard 
practice to handle patient referrals as he 
did Williamson's. His colleagues on the 
GAP Committee on College Students 
confirmed this statement. There is there- 
fore a factual dispute about the applicable 
standards of care, whether one assumes a 
national standard or one based on North 
Carolina law. My own opinion, however, 
is that the patient's experts stressed pro- 
cedural failings that have little to do with 
the actual substantive practice of psychi- 
atry in North Carolina or any other state. 
Over the past 50 years, forensic psy- 
chiatry has not only moved into a com- 
petitive market, it has developed as a 
subspecialty whose practitioners are in- 
creasingly sophisticated in matters of law. 
This may be the most striking feature of 
contemporary forensic psychiatrists- 
they sound like lawyers. Some of them 
seem to know more about certain areas of 
law than the lawyers who retain them. 
Rather than being coached by the law- 
yers, they are doing the coaching. The 
forensic psychiatrists of an earlier gener- 
ation saw their task as doing in the legal 
setting what they did in their  office^.^ The 
current generation increasingly accepts 
the idea that they are doing something 
quite different.2 Theirs is a discourse 
meant to anticipate the tactical manipula- 
tions of opposing counsel, and by invest- 
ing themselves in such a discourse they 
become more lawyer-like both by inten- 
tion and inadvertently. Eventually they 
think and speak differently from their 
clinical colleagues as they adapt to the 
adversarial forum. The leaders of forensic 
psychiatry also see themselves as recog- 
nizing a different set of ethics from what 
applies in their traditional role as physi- 
c i a n ~ . ~  Their basic axiom is honesty. 
Elsewhere I have commented on this 
special ethics. On the one hand it seems 
superfluous, since all witnesses are sworn 
to tell the truth. On the other hand it 
seems to have had little effect in limiting 
"junk" testimony. 
In fact, despite aspiring to an ethic of 
honesty, I believe forensic psychiatrists 
have succumbed to the rules of adver- 
sarial combat. They have inadvertently 
accepted the lawyers' view that the ad- 
versarial system of law requires experts 
for both sides (i.e., professionals who are 
prepared to take either side of the argu- 
ment). This is a paradigmatic shift in their 
professional outlook, which has signifi- 
cant consequences. 
Perhaps the most important axiom to 
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be learned in legal academia is that pro- 
fessional self-interests influence policy, 
judgment, and ethics more than they 
should. Nowhere is this axiom more man- 
ifest than in the legal profession itself. 
Law firms and lawyers with market 
power have found ways to justify levels 
of reimbursement that would shock the 
conscience of the law's own "reasonable 
person." Nor is there anything in the law- 
yers' elaborate principles of ethics that 
bars such self-interested profiteering. 
Their code of ethics calls for a lawyer to 
be a zealous advocate in the pursuit of 
justice. But under the sheep's clothing of 
zealous advocacy there is hidden a den of 
wolfish self-interests: billable hours, con- 
tingency fees, reputation, and pure ego to 
mention only a few. Although no profes- 
sion is more aware of potential conflicts 
of interest and the dangers of self-inter- 
ested actions, there is none more able to 
rationalize them. Zealous advocacy is of- 
ten the most useful rationalization of self- 
interested motives because it contains an 
undeniable kernel of truth about the re- 
quirements of our adversarial system. 
Malpractice litigation involves the fo- 
rensic psychiatrist in this web of self- 
interest, billable hours, reputation, and 
ego. Because the law in malpractice cases 
ordinarily requires the plaintiff to produce 
an expert witness to establish negligence, 
the plaintiff's lawyer cannot proceed 
without a helpful professional expert. 
Plaintiff's lawyers often complained in 
the past that physicians engaged in a con- 
spiracy of silence. Indeed, within hospi- 
tals and small communities of physicians 
there existed an almost tribal solidarity. 
But those customs and traditions have 
been eroding, and the growth of forensic 
psychiatry demonstrates that the conspir- 
acy of silence has been replaced by ex- 
perts competing to sell their expertise to 
either side of the case. Thus, a forensic 
psychiatrist asked to evaluate the Liptzin 
case for a plaintiff's lawyer who is seek- 
ing to retain him as an expert might begin 
with a lawyer-like perspective, "What 
within the bounds of honesty can be said 
against Dr. Liptzin's standards of care in 
the treatment of Mr. Williamson?" This 
attitude is quite different from asking 
oneself, "Is this a good psychiatrist to 
whom I would gladly refer a patient?" As 
recent empirical studies have shown, mal- 
practice litigation now deals with every 
shade of gray, and in some specialties 
(e.g., obstetrics) virtually every physi- 
cian, no matter how proficient his clinical 
skills may be, can expect to be sued in the 
course of his career. And lawyers cer- 
tainly no longer have difficulty finding 
expert witnesses willing to make a case 
against their  colleague^.^ 
This is not to suggest that all forensic 
psychiatrists or other experts think alike 
in such cases. There is a wide spectrum of 
opinion; nonetheless, being retained as an 
expert witness is how "forensic psychia- 
trists" earn their living. That means if 
they want to work, they have to say some- 
thing that the lawyer believes will help 
his side. ~ u t h e i l , ~  a leading authority in 
the field, has discussed the percentage of 
cases in which, in his experience, the 
forensic psychiatrist will turn down a re- 
taining attorney's request for his services 
on the grounds that the case cannot be 
supported.I0 This is a matter in which the 
"ethics of honesty" is sure to be tested. 
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Gutheil is himself a busy and respected 
forensic psychiatrist who can afford to 
turn down as many as 20 to 30 percent of 
requests. A novice may have an alto- 
gether different kind of pressure to estab- 
lish his or her practice and reputation with 
trial lawyers. A recent reviewer of Dr. 
Gutheil's book1' makes this point, ques- 
tioning the significance of the percentage 
of cases and suggesting other extenuating 
considerations that might allow an honest 
forensic psychiatrist to participate in 
cases that might not seem supportable. As 
the reviewer points out, whether one can 
testify honestly in a particular case de- 
pends very much on what the opposing 
experts have said. 
Forensic psychiatry's allegiance to the 
ethos of honesty as opposed to the med- 
ical ethos of primum non nocere (first of 
all do no harm) is a clear recognition of 
the different contexts in which they serve 
and the adversarial challenges and pitfalls 
of the expert witness. The adversarial sys- 
tem is the hallmark of the Anglo-Ameri- 
can system of justice, and lawyers are 
bound by their ethics to be zealous advo- 
cates. Although Gutheil may turn down 
20 to 30 percent of the attorneys who 
request his services, trial lawyers do not 
experience great difficulty in finding ex- 
perts willing to testify. The adversarial 
system requires lawyers and experts for 
both sides, and as the number of qualified 
forensic psychiatrists have increased, 
there is a buyer's market for experts. Fur- 
thermore, as forensic psychiatrists have 
become increasingly sophisticated in le- 
gal matters, they tend to think more like 
lawyers than like physicians. Lawyers 
typically put great weight on the impor- 
tance of procedures, and in my opinion 
that emphasis has made its way into fo- 
rensic psychiatry and to expert testimony 
in malpractice cases. As noted above, I 
believe the Williamson v. Liptzin case 
deals with procedural matters rather than 
substantive failings, and it thus reflects 
this legalistic approach. 
Many clinicians who work in univer- 
sity clinics were puzzled by the fact that 
expert psychiatric witnesses in the Liptzin 
case seemed to apply uniform standards 
of care in malpractice cases that do not 
take into account local practices. Their 
question is particularly pertinent in the 
Liptzin case, because the North Carolina 
legislature had passed a statute specifi- 
cally intending to exclude national or 
other uniform standards. That in fact is 
one of the more important developments 
in the law of malpractice. Over the past 
few decades most jurisdictions have 
moved toward national standards for the 
medical specialties like psychiatry." 
Plaintiff's lawyers see this as a progres- 
sive development. Along with other legal 
changes it has destroyed the so-called 
"conspiracy of silence," which made it 
difficult for plaintiffs to obtain expert wit- 
nesses from the same locality who would 
be willing to testify against their col- 
leagues. North Carolina's "same or simi- 
lar locality" standard rejects this "pro- 
gressive direction." Moreover the expert 
from a similar location must testify that 
he knows what the standards of care are 
in North Carolina where the alleged neg- 
ligence took place. North Carolina's rules 
would therefore limit the pool of potential 
expert witnesses including most of those 
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with national reputations who are associ- 
ated with teaching hospitals. 
The legal rules, however, control only 
certain parameters; the courts rely on the 
experts to establish the standards of care. 
Unfortunately there are no agreed upon 
professional standards for many of the 
things psychiatrists do in different set- 
tings and in periods of change. Often the 
expert witnesses have very little they can 
point to or rely on in their testimony. 
Consider the standard of care that so im- 
pressed the jurors-that Williamson 
should have been told that he had a very 
serious and chronic psychiatric illness, 
schizophrenia, paranoid type. This is one 
of the most difficult and complicated mat- 
ters a caring psychiatrist faces. The issue 
is even more vexing in a university men- 
tal health setting where there is appropri- 
ate concern that such a diagnosis will 
follow the young adult the rest of his life, 
limiting his personal and professional op- 
portunities even when there is a good 
treatment result. At the core of the clini- 
cal management problem is the patient's 
lack of insight into his illness and the fact 
that he may either experience the diagno- 
sis as an insult, provoking his rage, or as 
a defeat, leading to despair. As noted 
earlier, I know of no good scientific evi- 
dence that telling such a patient his diag- 
nosis leads to greater treatment compli- 
ance. Arguably one has an obligation to 
tell a patient his diagnosis as a matter of 
informed consent. But this is a situation 
in which a therapeutic exception can and 
should apply. 
Many forensic psychiatrists and other 
expert witnesses are painfully aware of 
the limitations of their testimony about 
Stone 
standards of care. Therefore, published 
standards of care are increasingly impor- 
tant and relied upon by forensic psychia- 
trists. Although many clinicians are un- 
aware of this literature, it may be relevant 
if a legal conflict arises. The late Dr. 
Gerald ~ l e r m a n ' ~  in a published ex- 
change with this writer set out as the 
standard of care very specific require- 
ments for the initiation of treatment. He 
tied his requirements to informed con- 
sent, thus entangling ethics and standards 
of care. 
It would seem that part of the grounds 
on which Dr. Liptzin was found negligent 
were taken from the Klerman standards. 
His first two standards were to make a 
DSM-IV diagnosis and to inform the pa- 
tient. Dr. Klerman made no allowance for 
a therapeutic exception or the negative 
consequences involved in informing a pa- 
tient of his schizophrenia when he has no 
insight into the fact that he is mentally ill. 
Klerman made a hard and fast rule for his 
proffered standards of care, and these 
have been accepted by some experts. 
Klerman's thesis13 at the time was that 
psychiatrists were providing inefficacious 
treatments, particularly psychoanalytic 
therapy, to patients who could benefit 
from other kinds of treatments. Since that 
time his general views about substantive 
treatment have overwhelmingly pre- 
vailed. However, he also set down a pro- 
cedural approach that, as the Liptzin case 
indicates, has become an issue in adver- 
sarial testimony in malpractice cases. I 
believe that the late Dr. Klerman would 
agree that Dr. Liptzin gave his patient 
efficacious care, and that was the under- 
lying goal of the approach he proposed. 
460 J Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1999 
The Forensic Psychiatrist as Expert Witness 
The shift in emphasis to Klerman's pro- 
cedure over Klerman's substance demon- 
strates how expert witnesses transform 
clinical wisdom into adversarial dis- 
course. 
Note Added in Proof 
Since the submission of this article, more in- 
formation about the expert testimony against Dr. 
Liptzin has been made available to me. It gives the 
other side of the story and demonstrates that the 
plaintiff's experts had "honest" criticisms of the 
care provided the patient. I expected and assumed 
nothing different. The basic premise of my essay 
remains unchanged. I believe that Dr. Liptzin pro- 
vided enviable care, that any failings were proce- 
dural rather than substantive, and that the tragic 
outcome was unforeseeable. Like many of his 
colleagues at GAP, I had the impression that, if Dr. 
Liptzin had rigidly followed the "procedures" that 
are the proposed standards of care, the patient 
would have refused treatment. 
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